This paper develops a theory of total factor productivity differences in a framework of technology diffusion. I show how in countries with tighter borrowing constraints, frontier technologies diffuse more slowly, and old outdated technologies continue to be used. I analyse how countries with different borrowing constraints specialise across new and old technologies through two forms of intra-industry trade. First, I consider international factor mobility which is interpreted as a form of (vertically differentiated) intermediate goods trade. Second, I consider trade in (vertically differentiated) final goods. Under both forms of trade, poor countries with tighter borrowing constraints exploit their comparative advantage through specialising in older technologies. However, under international factor mobility, poor countries can adopt new technologies faster by gaining access to inputs which complement the use of newer technologies. The patterns of specialisation across technologies are dramatically different under each form of trade. Despite this, both forms of trade are consistent with total factor productivity divergence between countries with different borrowing constraints.
Introduction
An emerging view attributes much of the differences in per capita income levels across countries, to differences in total factor productivity (TFP). 1 This has motivated Prescott (1998) to call for a "theory of TFP differences". If technologies are in the international public domain, an explanation for these persistent TFP differences must be framed in terms of differences in barriers to the adoption of new, high TFP technologies [Parente and Prescott (1994) ]. More specifically, a theory of TFP differences needs to address two observations: (i) why is the diffusion of frontier technologies slower in poor countries, and (ii) why do poor countries continue to use and invest in old technologies which have long been discarded from production in rich countries?
This paper develops a theory of TFP differences in a framework of technology diffusion. The source of my TFP differences are exogenous differences in borrowing possibilities, which result from differences in the quality of institutions which enforce external investor rights. When new technologies are associated with higher "investment" relative to old technologies, tighter borrowing constraints lower output by distorting the allocation of inputs away from high investment activities to low investment activities.
I go on to consider the impact of intra-industry trade on the magnitude of the TFP differences which arise. A running debate in the empirical literature on international technology diffusion is why increased trade and technology transfer between rich and poor countries leads to ambiguous effects on the TFP of poor countries, and ambiguous effects on convergence in TFPs between rich and poor countries [Coe and Helpman (1995) , Keller (1998) , Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) with King and Levine (1993) and is reviewed in Levine (1997) .
These studies do not unambiguously resolve the issue of causality between enforcement institutions and growth, but recent progress has been made on this front. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) show how various measures of investor rights are systematically linked to the legal origin of enforcement institutions. Since countries typically adopted one of four legal systems (English, French, German, Scandinavian) through occupation or colonisation, the implied differences in investor rights are seen as exogenous. In the literature on finance and growth, the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny indices of investor rights and legal origin are used as instruments to extract the exogenous component of financial development and control for simultaneity bias. In particular, studies find that the main channel through which financial development and investor rights affect growth is through TFP rather than through savings or capital accumulation levels [Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) , Wurgler (2000) ]. Instead of highlighting the identity of colonisers, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that the conditions for settlement by colonisers came to determine institutional quality. Using colonialist mortality rates as instruments for institutional quality, they find large effects of this variable on current per capita income levels. 3 Although the environment studied is inherently dynamic, it is possible to introduce many of the main mechanisms of the theory in terms of a simple static economy (readers may skip this by going to the penultimate paragraph of the introduction). Consider a stationary two period overlapping generations economy, where ex ante identical agents can become entrepreneurs or workers. Workers earn a constant wage in both periods of their lives. Entrepreneurs hire workers from competitive labour markets and maximise profits subject to a production function which is concave in worker inputs. To become an entrepreneur, every agent must acquire skills through learning-by-doing in youth, and in youth such agents receive a fixed income. Equilibrium wages equalise the utility of ex ante identical agents across occupations. Since entrepreneurs earn more than workers, lifetime earnings profiles are steeper for agents planning to become entrepreneurs, and such agents are "investing" in youth in terms of foregone earnings.
Suppose agents have concave utility functions over consumption in each period of their lives. Compare outcomes when subject to budget constraints (i) young agents can borrow as much as they like, and (ii) they can only commit a fixed share of their old period incomes as collateral for loans: borrowing constraints. In the first case, equilibrium wages equalise discounted lifetime earnings across occupations. In the second case, the equilibrium wage is lower, because borrowing constraints have a greater disutility effect on young agents with steeper earnings profiles, who plan to become entrepreneurs. In this second case, although lifetime utilities are lower, discounted lifetime earnings are higher for entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, for workers, discounted lifetime earnings are lower.
Since entrepreneurs' input demands are higher, the share of entrepreneurs in the economy must fall. Borrowing constraints lower aggregate output by distorting the allocation of agents across the two occupations.
Next, suppose that the two cases describe two coexisting economies in the world, and consider outcomes under free international mobility of agents (i.e. factor price equalisation 
In credit markets, the imperfect enforcement of investor rights means that young agents can only borrow up to a fraction θ, of their discounted old period earnings for young period consumption,
Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers cannot credibly commit to use more than a fraction θ of their old period earnings as collateral. 4 
Technology
Agents inhabit a "vintage human capital" economy. In every period, a frontier technology is exogenously introduced whose TFP is γ > 1 times greater than the TFP of last period's frontier technology. Let τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} index the vintage or age of a technology in period t, relative to the newest technology in that period (this implies that the identity of technology τ changes every period). Date t output in technology τ, is a constant returns to scale function of skilled labour Z τ,t , and unskilled labour N τ,t inputs, π τ,t (w τ,t ) = max
A young worker who enters vintage τ − 1 in period t − 1, earns w τ −1,t−1 in youth and becomes skilled in vintage τ in period t. When old this agent is free be an entrepreneur to earn π τ,t (w τ,t ) or exercise the option of being an old worker in any other vintage. Assume that skilled agents choose to be entrepreneurs only if they are strictly better off doing so:
Note that young workers in the frontier technology necessarily produce by themselves to earn w 0,t = γ t F (0, 1) ≡ γ t ω 0 . To summarise, the combination of young and old period earnings for this 5 Since F ZN > 0 ⇔ f 00 (n) < 0, the solution to the entrepreneur's maximisation problem is unique.
generic agent who is young in period t − 1 is given by,
At each moment of time, agents are distributed across technologies of different ages relative to the frontier technology. Let µ τ,t denote the share of old agents in the population who are skilled in vintage τ, and µ t the entire distribution. Since period t skilled agents in vintage τ, were period t−1 workers in vintage τ −1, we know that
for ∀τ ≥ 1.
Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium: in every period (i) each young worker chooses which technology specific skill to acquire, how much to earn and consume across periods in order to maximise lifetime utility (1) subject to the interest factor R, and the constraints (2), (3) and (6);
(ii) old agents maximise their earnings and (iii) the labour markets for technology specific workers clear.
The indirect utility of young workers, v(y 1 , y 2 ; θ, R) can be rearranged to express utility as the product of the present discounted value of earnings, a constant
, and a fraction,
This separates out the effects on utility of (i) the level of present discounted earnings and (ii) borrowing constraints and the steepness of the This characterisation of indirect utility will assist the analysis of equilibrium outcomes throughout the paper. Using (6), denote the "lifetime earnings discount factor" for the generic agent who is young in period t − 1 as,
Since ex ante identical young workers are utility maximisers, the earnings path for each vintage with positive entry by young agents must yield an indirect utility at least as high as any other vintage,
for all τ, ν such that n τ −1 > 0.
I restrict analysis to that of stationary competitive equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is a collection of earnings profiles w τ,t , π τ,t (w τ,t ); input demands n τ,t ; distribution functions µ t such that, (i) The distribution of agents across vintages is stationary µ τ,t = µ τ , input demands are stationary n τ,t = n τ , and earnings profiles grow at a constant rate w τ,t = γ t w τ , π τ,t (w τ,t ) = γ t π τ (w τ ).
(ii) Young workers are indifferent among vintages they enter into (9), and old agents maximise their earnings.
(iii) The full employment condition is satisfied:
A stationary equilibrium is characterised by an invariant distribution of agents relative to a constantly changing frontier technology. Although earnings levels are steadily increasing, the "lifetime earnings discount factors" across vintages are stationary since they are functions of the ratio of young and old period earnings. The restriction to stationary outcomes means that time indices will be dropped throughout the rest of the paper. Since δ τ is falling in the steepness of the lifetime earnings profile, the present discounted value of lifetime earnings is falling in vintage. 7 In equilibrium, the indifference condition across coexisting vintages is given by,
Young workers who enter the frontier technology necessarily produce by themselves so earn w 0 = ω 0 .
The highest worker wage in the economy is weakly lower than the entrepreneur earnings of the penultimate technology, and strictly higher than the entrepreneur earnings of the terminal technology. Thus, w T −1
serves as an index of the number of vintages in use in the economy,
Inequalities (10) and (11) are used to iteratively solve for T and the T − 1 worker wages. The implied input demands across vintages, (ii)
from Proposition 1 and the full employment constraint are combined to solve for µ 1 first, and then the density of old agents across older vintages.
For vintages 1 to T −2, Proposition 1 (ii) says that the growth factor of skilled agent density is exactly given by the input demands n τ , while for vintage T − 1, this growth factor is given by half the input demand.
Since input demands are falling in vintage, there exists a vintage S, such that n τ < 1 for all ∀τ ≥ S. Combining this with (ii) from Proposition 1 implies that the density function of skilled agents across vintages is 7 Thompson (1999) tests whether earnings profiles are steeper in newer technologies using historical data from the Canadian Maritime History Archive. He investigates the variation in wages across three vessel technologies (steam, barques and riggers) and finds strong support for this prediction.
single peaked at technology S. The vintage with peak density is one way to think about the rate of technology diffusion: the time elapsed between the introduction and peak usage of a technology. I adopt this definition of diffusion throughout.
When a technology is introduced, it is first learned by young workers producing alone. As the technology ages, the supply of entrepreneurs per worker increases
, such that workers can exploit the complementarities in skilled and unskilled labour to a greater extent. The process through which as a technology ages, workers can earn progressively higher wages while learning a given set of skills, is how I will define the process of technology "standardisation" in this paper.
Differences in borrowing constraints
In this section, I perform comparative statics on the economy by varying the degree of borrowing constraint θ. Note that since labour endowments and the level of skills acquired by workers are held constant, any aggregate output differences resulting from varying the borrowing constraint θ, are TFP differences. A simple example is used to flesh out the main results, then the general result is presented and a discussion of implications follows. Consider an equilibrium economy where T = 2, and borrowing constraints are binding for young workers who enter the frontier technology (i.e. δ 1 < 1). Participation constraints determine the vintage 1 worker wage, given θ and R,
These two earnings paths can simply be referred to as new technology and old technology occupations. Using the results of Proposition 1 and the full employment constraint, the share of skilled agents in technology 2 is equal to half the input demand of skilled agents in technology 1,
This solves for the density of skilled agents across the two vintages. 
for all τ where µ τ > 0
(ii) the terminal vintage is older in theθ economyT ≥ T (iii)μ stochastically dominates µ,
Proof in Appendix.
Recall that the density function for skilled agents across vintages peaks at the youngest vintage such that n τ < 1. vintage, the steepness of the earnings profile is higher in theθ economy: 8 This interpretation has implications for the debate between two alternative approaches in analysing levels differences in per capita income. The factor neutral characteristic of TFP means that technologies are ranked along a single dimension, and there is a unique frontier technology in the world. An alternative approach first formulised by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) , argues that the menu of technologies exhibits different degrees of efficiency bias toward specific factors of production, so countries with different factor endowments will choose different sets of "appropriate technologies". Caselli and Coleman (2000) find a negative cross country correlation between the efficiency of uneducated labour and educated labour, and present this as evidence in favour of the appropriate technology approach.
My analysis suggests a way to reconcile these two approaches. Differences in the stock of skills across technologies imply that econometric studies will detect higher per worker productivity (for a given measure of workers) in old technologies in poor countries, and higher per worker productivity in new technologies in rich countries. This is the case assuming econometric studies cannot differentiate between skilled and unskilled labour when skills are acquired through learning-by-doing (this is the case in Caselli and Coleman). Suppose educated agents are more likely to work in new technologies than uneducated agents. Then cross country results such as those of Caselli and Coleman would be consistent with the underlying TFP approach of my framework.
. Givenθ < θ, the implied fall in the lifetime earnings discount factor,δ τ ≤ δ τ , means that within vintages, the efficiency with which earnings are converted into utility is lower in theθ economy.
Since all entrepreneur earnings are higher and the highest worker wage is lower, the skill premium within vintages is higher in theθ econ-
where young workers face borrowing constraints, it is intuitive to expect the "reward" (skill premium) of "investment" (in terms of foregone earnings) to be higher if the "cost" of investment rises (lower borrowing constraints). However, the equilibrium effects also lead to higher skill premiums in older vintages which may not be subject to borrowing constraints.
Since input demands are lower within each vintage, n τ (ŵ τ ) < n τ (w τ ), it takes longer for a particular ratio of entrepreneur per worker to be realised. This implies that workers in theθ economy have to wait longer to command a given level of wages while learning a set of skills associated with a particular technology. Thus, tighter borrowing constraints slow the rate of technology standardisation.
[ Figure 2 ] shows the equilibrium combinations of young and old period earnings of the two economies along their respective indifference curves. Since
≤ 0, differences in borrowing constraints imply that these indifference curves are single crossing. Suppose these two economies coexisted but there is no international worker mobility. Even if the degree of borrowing constraints that agents face are dependent on the economy of origin, young workers from theθ economy, would prefer to migrate to the θ economy, and work in older technologies. Meanwhile, young workers from the θ economy, would prefer to migrate to theθ economy, and work in newer vintages. Note that, workers in theθ 3 Intra-industry trade
International labour mobility as intermediate goods trade
This section applies the basic model, with differences in borrowing constraints, to investigate patterns of specialisation across technologies which result from international labour mobility. Of course, the mobility of all factors of production must imply there is complete factor price equalisation. Note that since within vintages, workers produce with one other factor of production (entrepreneurs), it is sufficient for factor price equal-isation that only entrepreneurs are internationally mobile. Consider two coexisting economies of equal size, economy θ and economyθ, where θ >θ. 10 The interest rate R is constant. All agents are subject to the borrowing constraints prevailing in their country of origin.
Under international mobility of labour, there is a "single economy" pop- A stationary competitive equilibrium with labour mobility is defined as previously, subject to the following modifications. First, young workers in each economy are indifferent among only those vintages that their 9 Or vice versa, only workers are internationally mobile. 10 There is another interesting dimension arising from the relative size of the two economies which is not explored here. compatriots enter into; i.e. for the θ economy,
for all τ, ν such that n 0 τ −1 > 0, and similarly for theθ economy. Second, the full employment constraint is now given by: to exploit the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labour in production. The latter allows theθ economy to adopt new technologies through a earnings path which is shallow relative to outcomes without labour mobility. As technologies age, they become more standardised as workers can command higher wages while learning a given set of skills.
Agents from poor countries with equal access to the technology frontier as rich countries, wait for technologies to become standardised to a given level before adopting them from rich countries. (iii)μ stochastically dominates µ W , µ W stochastically dominates µ,
Intuitively, the pattern of technology diffusion and the range of coexisting technologies used in the world under labour mobility, is bounded by the pattern of technology use in the two economies without labour mobility. [ Figure 3 ] plots the distribution of skilled agents across vintages in each economy under no mobility, together with the world distribution , is lower with labour mobility: TFP convergence.
[ Figure 4 ] shows the combination of young and old period earnings experienced by agents from both economies under labour mobility. These combinations are mapped along the lower envelope of the indifferences curves of agents from the two economies. Agents from both economies must be on higher indifference curves as a result of labour mobility.
In the θ economy w 0 1 < w 1 ensures lifetime utility is higher for young workers entering the frontier vintage. In theθ economy, w given by,
Final goods trade
where v is strictly increasing, strictly concave and v(0) = 0. 11 I assume preferences are homothetic across goods.
I now interpret new technologies as introducing new goods, where the quality index of the frontier good increases by a factor γ in each period.
Let x τ denote the steady state measure of goods produced using vintage τ technologies, the quality index of which increases by a factor γ each period. The quality z = 1 good is the numeraire. Homothetic preferences imply that relative prices are functions of the aggregate supply of goods of different quality, and independent of the distribution of income in the economy. In steady states, the date t relative price of the vintage τ good is given by γ t p τ where,
If v is linear, the analysis collapses to that of the homogenous output economy.
From the concavity of v(·), the ratio
≥ γ is falling in τ and strictly greater than γ for all τ ≤ T − 1.
A considerable aid to the exposition is to redefine worker wages in terms of the price of final goods they produce, define w τ ≡ p τ ν τ for all τ ≥ 1. This implies that entrepreneur earnings can be rewritten as, A stationary competitive equilibrium is defined as in the case of the economy with homogenous output, subject to some modifications. Now an equilibrium consists of a stationary collection of earning profiles p τ ν τ , p τπ (ν τ ), input demandsñ(ν τ ), distribution function µ and prices p τ such that (i) young and old agents maximise their utility, (ii) the full employment constraint is satisfied, (iii) the market for goods of each quality clears:
Equilibrium participation constraints are modified as follows,
Given the relationship between prices p τ , note that as before the steepness of the lifetime earnings profile must be falling in vintage. Noting
γ T , the conditions on the terminal vintage are modified as follows,
The vintage for which ν τ −1 falls within this range determines the age of the terminal vintage T .
Differences in borrowing constraints
I use a simple example to flesh out the main mechanisms and then present the general results. Consider an equilibrium economy where T = 2 and borrowing constraints are binding in the economy (i.e. δ 1 < 1). Participation constraints determine the vintage 1 worker wage, given θ, R, p 0 and p 1 ,
The share of skilled agents in vintage 2 is equal to half the input demand of skilled agents in vintage 1,
Two quality differentiated goods are produced, where their market clearing conditions are given by, x 0 = µ 1 ω 0 and x 1 = µ 1 f (ñ(ν 1 )). The relative prices of quality differentiated goods (normalised by γ t ) are given by, 
. Then, equilibrium relative prices of quality differentiated goods in theθ economy are given by,
Since vintage
While lower borrowing constraints discourage entry into younger vintages, the resulting reallocation of agents across vintages leads to relative price changes which encourage entry into younger vintages. Thus, relative price changes under autarchy, dampen the effect of borrowing constraints on the distribution of agents across vintages. Lemma 2 summarises the general results which are similar to those of Proposition 2.
Lemma 2 Compare two economies with different borrowing constraintsθ < θ, where δ 1 < 1, then,
(ii) the terminal vintage is older in theθ economyT ≥ T (iii)μ stochastically dominates µ, Proof in Appendix.
Impact of final goods trade
Consider two coexisting economies of equal size, economy θ and economŷ 
(iii) in theθ economy worker wages in each vintage are lowerp
and the terminal vintage is olderT 0 ≥T under trade
Barriers to trade encourage "excessive" entry into high quality production in theθ economy. Under free trade, the distribution of agents across vintages is associated with slower technology diffusion and an older terminal vintage. In the θ economy, the opposite is true. Barriers to trade encourage excessive entry into relatively low quality production.
Under free trade, the distribution of agents across vintages is associated with faster technology diffusion and a younger terminal vintage. [ Figure   5 ] summaries changes in the distribution of skilled agents across vintages caused by free trade in vertically differentiated final goods.
The introduction of trade definitely improves steady state welfare in the θ economy. Since p
, lifetime welfare has increased for young workers entering the penultimate vintage. From the participation constraints this ensures that welfare has increased throughout the θ economy. In theθ economy, the opposite happens to the worker wage of the penultimate technology, but trade may still be associated with higher steady state welfare from the relative price fall of high quality products.
Conclusion
This paper developed a theory of TFP differences arising from exogenous differences in institutions which enforce external investor rights. In the context of technology diffusion, such differences generated many of the The implications of the theory may also be applied to related issues. One potential application is in understanding residual inequality dynamics between rich and poor nations and their relation to trade.
Large increases in residual inequality have been well documented in rich countries since the early 1970s. 12 An independent role for trade in ex- 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
First show that if µ T = 0 for some
This must imply that π T (w T ) < π T +1 (w T +1 ), but using the definition of π τ (w τ ), and noting that w T +1 ≥ γ −T −1 ω 0 this leads to a contradiction.
Second show that T = ∞ leads to a contradiction. Begin by sup-
Using the definition of π τ (w τ ), and noting that w τ ≥ γ −τ ω 0 this leads to a contradiction. Next suppose
is falling in worker wages and vintage, the claim is contradicted.
Next show that w τ < w τ +1 for all τ with µ τ > 0. Let T be the terminal vintage. Suppose The existence proof of a unique stationary equilibrium can directly appeal to Proposition 2 and the Theorem in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991).
Proof of Proposition 2. First show that w τ >ŵ τ . Suppose w 1 ≤ŵ 1 , from (10) this implies that w 2 ≤ŵ 2 , and by induction w τ ≤ŵ τ , all τ ≤T . Note from (11)T ≤ T. Since ∂δ ∂θ > 0 when δ 1 < 1, revealed preference implies,
,θ ¶ =k contradicts the inequality. So w 1 >ŵ 1 , and by induction w τ >ŵ τ for all 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1 and δ τ ≥δ τ for all 1 ≤ τ ≤ T, andT ≥ T from (11) .
Using the relationships between successive densities from Proposition 1 (ii), the full employment condition can be rearranged to yield the following expression for the density of skilled workers in vintage 1,
inceT ≥ T and n τ (w τ ) < n τ (ŵ τ ) for all τ ≤ T − 1, µ 1 >μ 1 . Let Q be the youngest vintage such thatμ Q > µ Q . SinceT ≥ T, n τ (w τ ) < n τ (ŵ τ ), and µ 1 >μ 1 stochastic dominance follows for all S < Q. It also follows thatμ S > µ S for allT ≥ S ≥ Q, so PT Sμτ > PT S µ τ . This implies that 1 − P S−1 τ =1μτ > 1 − P S−1 τ =1 µ τ , which establishes the result. (11), the latter implies that indirect utility would be higher if young workers in the θ economy enter the terminal technology, and this is a contradiction. So w 0 1 ≥ w 1 , and by induction w 0 τ ≥ w τ . Result (ii) follows from the argument that the level of the highest worker wages serves as an index of the number of coexisting vintages in (11) . The proof of stochastic dominance is similar to that for Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given an equilibrium exists and is unique from the Theorem of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) , I verify such an equilibrium satisfies the conditions of the Lemma. If relative prices between quality differentiated products are held constant, we know from Proposition 2 that whenθ < θ,ñ(ν υ ) >ñ(ν υ ).The task is to prove that this impliesp Givenñ(ν υ ) >ñ(ν υ ) the result follows. The proof of stochastic dominance is similar to that for Proposition 2.
